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ABSTRACT
Techniques are presented herein that employ a HyperLedger (i.e., a private
blockchain) to allow authenticated machine learning (ML) components to interact with
each other and sign messages (having pre-processed data) which are exchanged between
the components to provide message authenticity. Along with authenticity, aspects of the
presented techniques provide for the traceability and accountability of ML components.
Aspects of the presented techniques may be employed across different operators and
domains wherein a HyperLedger provides for the authenticity of the ML components.
Further aspects of the presented techniques may be employed within an operator or within
an instance (such as an Access and Mobility Management Function (AMF), a Session
Management Function (SMF), etc.) wherein a centralized ML system or software can act
as central repositories for all of the authenticated ML components along with their
corresponding public key (which may be used for verification of the signed messages that
are exchanged between the ML components). In such a case, the functionality of the
HyperLedger may be performed by a centralized ML system or software.
DETAILED DESCRIPTION
As an initial matter, it will be helpful to confirm the meaning of a few terms that
appear in the narrative that is presented below. Specifically:
Term

Meaning

AMF

Access and Mobility Management Function

DoD

Denial of Detection

DoS

Denial of Service

HyperLedger

A private, permissive blockchain-based authenticated ledger

IoT

Internet of Things
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ML

Machine Learning

NFV

Network Function Virtualization

SDN

Software-Defined Network

SMF

Session Management Function

UPF

User Place Function

ML techniques are attempting to, and are expected to, solve many of the challenges
in Third Generation Partnership Project (3GPP) fifth generation (5G) network deployments
regarding improving the performance of the network and the services that use the
underlying network as an enabler for such services. Additionally, the increasing complexity
of communication networks due to a heterogeneity in networking equipment, end-user
devices, applications, and services forces the automation of network operations (including,
for example, minimizing manual configurations or human involvement; self-control; and
adaptation and self-healing with changing user, service, and traffic requirements as well as
dynamic network conditions) which, in turn, requires ML.
Within such a context, ML techniques may be used in multiple application areas in
a 5G deployment. Those areas include:
•

Infrastructure Management: ML may be used for intelligent load balancing,
resource allocation (e.g., to manage peak traffic loads), the prioritization of
traffic, etc.

•

Network Operations: ML may be used to identify the optimal radio frequency
(RF) parameters to optimize radio coverage and capacity based on a location,
load, etc.

•

Service Orchestration: ML may be used to allocate custom resources and
functions to application-specific end-to-end slices.

•

Assurance: ML may be used to analyze a network to identify and predict faults,
and their root causes, as well as to allocate resources to recover from faults and
to guarantee agreed upon service levels.

•

Security Applications: ML may be used for anomaly- or signature-based
intrusion detection as well as for realistic honeypot and vulnerability scanning.
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However, ML techniques will also open a network to several serious security
vulnerabilities (i.e., challenges) – such as, for example, an unfair use of resources, DoS,
DoD, a leakage of private and confidential information, etc. – through the introduction of
false data to a system (which is learning or operational), eavesdropping, the interception,
or the modification of transmitted data by an adversary using compromised ML component,
etc.
To illustrate the types of vulnerabilities that were described above, Figure 1, below,
depicts various of the threats that may exist to ML in a 5G deployment.

Figure 1: Exemplary Threats to ML in 5G Deployment
There are several reasons for the types of ML-induced security vulnerabilities that
were described and illustrated above.
First, most of the learning in a ML context happens through data that is gathered
from the environment. Such data may comprise un-scrutinized data which will have serious
consequences on machines absorbing the data to produce actionable intelligence for the
network. Such data may also comprise scrutinized data which will open privacy issues
(challenges).
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Second, most of the ML systems for 5G deployments are borrowed from other
disciplines that provide excellent results in small, closed environments and deployments.
Third, in other words, the concepts of ML for 5G are being borrowed from existing
mature technologies such as machine vision and robotics. Those ML concepts solve a
problem that is under consideration, but they can introduce security challenges which
include an inefficient use of network resources for gathering and disseminating the data,
straining the processing and memory capabilities of different networked nodes, and
unintentionally opening the network to the security vulnerabilities.
Fourth, ML algorithms and software may come from different suppliers (which
may include open-source components) and an adversary or an attacker may already be
aware of such components.
Each of the 5G deployment application areas that were described above face threats
if any one of the ML components is compromised or integrated with a malicious thirdparty (or even open source) component or application (as an attacker is already aware of
the open source and/or the third-party algorithms and methods that are used in ML).
While some existing solutions may provide authentication, security (e.g., access
controls, a firewall, or physical security), and trust establishment between 5G network
entities, there are multiple ML use cases where these are not sufficient to entangle threats
that may be induced by compromised or malicious ML component and applications (as
will be described below).
Accordingly, a mechanism is needed to authenticate each ML component (and the
communication that takes place between the components) while gathering data, processing
the data, sharing the data across ML components, and predicting and taking a final decision
to solve a specific problem (which could be intelligent load balancing, predicting the faults,
prioritizing the traffic, resource allocation, etc.).
Techniques are presented herein, which will be described and illustrated in the
below narrative, that address the need that was described above.
As described previously, ML techniques may be used in different 5G network
deployments. ML may be used in the access network to increase spectral efficiency or for
other intelligent uses of radio resources. ML may be used in the edge (near the access
network) to intelligently serve latency-critical services by providing higher resources in the
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edge and to Internet of things (IoT) devices. ML may be used in the backhaul or transport
network for traffic classification or for improving network management with the help of a
software-defined network (SDN). ML may also be used for improving the performance of
cloud-based services.
However, the use of ML techniques will open a network to several serious security
vulnerabilities and challenges (through the introduction of false data to a ML system
(which is learning or operational), through eavesdropping, and through the interception and
modification of transmitted data (i.e., masquerading) by an adversary using a compromised
ML component) such as DoS, DoD, a lack of confidentiality (e.g., a leaking of private and
confidential information), a lack of privacy (e.g., a leaking of privacy information), and an
unfair use of resources.
As noted previously, while some existing solutions may provide authentication,
security (e.g., access controls, a firewall, or physical security), and trust establishment
between 5G network entities, there are multiple ML use cases where these are not sufficient
to entangle threats that may be induced by compromised or malicious ML component or
applications. For example, data sources may be administered in different domains by
different entities resulting in their trustworthiness becoming difficult to determine by
centralized ML components. Further, misbehaving user equipment (UE) may input
malicious data for ML functions which utilize information from the UE ML components.
Additionally, open-source components (which are known by adversaries who are
practicing attacks) may be integrated with ML algorithms and software. Still further, ML
components may be from different suppliers (these are also called white-box attacks).
Consequently, as described above, a mechanism is needed to authenticate each ML
component (as well as the communication that takes between the components) while
gathering data, processing the gathered data, sharing the data across ML components, and
predicting and taking a final decision to solve a specific problem (which could be
intelligent load balancing, predicting the faults, prioritizing the traffic, resource allocation,
etc.).
Techniques are presented herein that address the need that was described above
using a HyperLedger (i.e., a private blockchain) to enable authenticated ML components
to interact with each other and sign the messages (having preprocessed data) that are
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exchanged between them to provide message authenticity. Along with authenticity, aspects
of the presented techniques provide for the traceability and accountability of ML
components.
According to aspects of the presented techniques, each ML component may register
with a HyperLedger (i.e., a private blockchain) during initialization as a subsystem with a
ML system or software. Further, a ML component may generate a public key and a private
key pair during registration (i.e., initialization) and then update their public key to the
HyperLedger. Additionally, whenever a ML component wishes to send processed data as
a message to another ML component it may sign the message using its private key. Still
further, an ML component that receives a message may retrieve the public key of the source
ML component to verify and validate the signature of the message.
Using the presented techniques, only authenticated ML components can exchange
processed data with the other ML components. Malicious ML components and
compromised ML components cannot participate in the ML activities.
Figure 2, below, presents elements of an exemplary arrangement according to
aspects of the techniques presented herein that is reflective of the above narrative.
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Figure 2: Generic 5G Network Architecture Using Authenticated ML
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Aspects of the techniques presented herein may be used across different operators
or domains wherein a HyperLedger (i.e., a blockchain) provides authenticity for the ML
components.
Further aspects of the presented techniques may be used within an operator or
within an instance (such as an AMF, a SMF, etc.), wherein a centralized ML system or
software can act as central repositories for all the authenticated ML components along with
their corresponding public key (which may be used for verification of the signed messages
that are exchanged between the ML components). In this case, the functionality of the
HyperLedger is performed by a centralized ML system or software.
For simplicity of exposition, the following description of the techniques presented
herein is divided into four parts, each of which will be described in detail below. A first
part encompasses the identification and authentication of the ML components. A second
part encompasses the authentication of the messages and data that is exchanged between
ML components. A third part encompasses the periodic updating of ML status data and
statistics to the HyperLedger. A fourth part encompasses traceability and accountability.
The first part, which encompasses the identification and the authentication of the
ML components, employs an identifier (ID), a public key (PK), a private key (SK) and a
type (TYPE) for each ML component. As part of the initialization (e.g., the registration) of
a ML component with a system (e.g., a ML application or software), a PK and SK would
be generated by the ML component. The SK is securely stored locally (within the
component) and the PK is shared with other ML components by adding it into the
distributed HyperLedger (i.e., a private Blockchain). The generated PK and SK may be
used later to re-authenticate or re-register with the blockchain.
The second part, which encompasses the authentication of the messages and the
data that is exchanged between ML components, employs the SK of a ML component to
sign a message (comprising processed data) by the ML component (e.g., a source ML
component) before sending the message to the other ML component (e.g., a target ML
component). A target ML component that receives the message from a source ML
component retrieves the PK of the source ML component from the HyperLedger. That PK
may then be used to validate the signature of the message and, in turn, verify the
authenticity of message that was sent by the source ML component.
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The third part, which encompasses the periodic updating of ML status data and
statistics to the HyperLedger, includes a ML component periodically updating the
HyperLedger with information about the ML’s status and statistics (e.g., the number of
errors (both known and unknown), the percentage of correct predictions, the number of
messages that were received by and sent to the other ML components, etc.). Such
information aids in traceability and accountability.
The fourth part, which encompasses traceability and accountability, provides
information that can assist operators with troubleshooting an issue (e.g., when something
breaks down or suffers from abnormal behaviors). Aspects of the presented techniques
enable the traceability of ML components, along with their status and statistics, which helps
in capturing system behavior.
Within a running ML component, if the component suffers abnormal attacks (such
as, for example, receiving message from a compromised ML) the attack processing is also
logged as transactions. With such logged transactions of attack trajectories, any future
attacks that may be launched on the ML component may be identified (using attack pattern
recognition).
It is important to note that any number of existing blockchain-related processing
mechanisms (including, for example, sharding methods, etc.) may be applied to the
techniques presented herein to scale those techniques to extremely high transaction levels
(that are analogous to, for example, the transaction levels of large credit card processing
facilities).
Use of the techniques presented herein offers several advantages. For example,
aspects of the presented techniques enable an authenticated ML component to rightly
predict the future and intelligently take appropriate actions. Further, aspects of the
presented techniques may be used across different operators and domains wherein a
HyperLedger (i.e., a blockchain) provides for the authenticity of ML components.
Additionally, aspects of the presented techniques may be used within an operator or within
an instance (such as an AMF, a SMF, etc.), wherein a centralized ML system or software
can act as a central repository for all of the authenticated ML components along with their
corresponding public key (which may be used for verification of the signed messages that
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are exchanged between the ML components) wherein the functionality of the HyperLedger
is performed by a centralized ML system or software.
Aspects of the techniques presented herein may be employed under several
different use cases. For example, aspects of the presented techniques are applicable to IoT
environments (such as a smart city), an automotive IoT environment (such as a connected
car), etc. wherein ML is an important part of the 5G network deployment. Additionally,
aspects of the presented techniques are applicable to the use of ML capabilities in remote
services and cloud deployments.
In summary, techniques have been presented that employ a HyperLedger (i.e., a
private blockchain) to allow authenticated ML components to interact with each other and
sign messages (having pre-processed data) which are exchanged between the components
to provide message authenticity. Along with authenticity, aspects of the presented
techniques provide for the traceability and accountability of ML components. Aspects of
the presented techniques may be employed across different operators and domains wherein
a HyperLedger provides for the authenticity of the ML components. Further aspects of the
presented techniques may be employed within an operator or within an instance (such as
an AMF, a SMF, etc.) wherein a centralized ML system or software can act as central
repositories for all of the authenticated ML components along with their corresponding
public key (which may be used for verification of the signed messages that are exchanged
between the ML components). In such a case, the functionality of the HyperLedger may
be performed by a centralized ML system or software.
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